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FOREWORD: OF CHICKENS AND EGGSTHE COMPATIBILITY OF MORAL
RIGHTS AND CONSEQUENTIALIST
ANALYSES
RANDY

E.

BARNE'IT*

CHICKENS AND EGGS

Philosophers are accustomed to thinking of moral rights and
consequentialist analyses as fundamentally incompatible. They
frequently debate cases-both hypothetical and real-in which
rights and consequences are in conflict. 1 For example, suppose
an innocent child knows the whereabouts of a terrorist who has
planted a nuclear bomb in a city. Would it be permissible to
violate the child's moral right to be free from torture, if this was
the only way to save millions of innocent lives? If this is permissible, then do not moral rights yield to concerns about consequences? Or suppose that a community incorrectly believes
that an innocent person is guilty of a heinous crime. If the beneficial consequences exceed the harmful consequences, would
it be permissible to punish or even kill this innocent person? If
not, then do not consequential concerns yield to moral rights?
Three approaches are commonly taken to handle the potential conflict between rights and consequences. Some, perhaps
most legal academics, purport to "balance" these competing
concerns in an unspecified manner. Others, perhaps most philosophers and economists, choose either moral rights or consequentialism as their exclusive mode of normative analysis. Still
others allow the value of both modes of analysis, but they resolve potential conflicts by giving one mode of analysis priority
within some hierarchical scheme.
The idea of avoiding conflicts between competing methods
of evaluation by establishing the priority of one method is
analogous to modern jurisprudential views of legal systems as
purely hierarchical or, to use Lon Fuller's word, vertical. 2 This
• Professor ofl..aw, Illinois Institute ofTechnology, Chicago-Kent College of Law. I
wish to thank Ian Ayres, Mark Grady, Linda Hirshman, Gary Lawson, Loren Lomasky,
and Tom Palmer for commenting on an earlier draft.
1. Ste Lomasky, Rights Without Stilts, 12 HARv.J.L. &: PuB. PoL'Y 775, 777-81 (1989).
2. Set L. FULLER, THE MoRALITY OF LAw 233 (rev ed. 1969) (distinguishing between
horizontal and vertical forms of order).
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contrasts with an older view that acknowledged both the legitimacy and importance of many rival legal systems coexisting
within a single legal order. 8 Professor Fuller suggested that the
conception of law as a hierarchical command is so appealing
because it "expresses a concern with the problem of resolving
conflicts within the legal system." 4 In all but international affairs (and even sometimes not there), it is difficult for many to
understand or accept the possibility of the equal coexistence of
decisionmakers within an over-all order that is ultimately
nonhierarchical or, to use Lon Fuller's term, horizontal. 5
The prevailing belief that conflicts, whether between competing legal systems or between competing modes of normative analysis, can be resolved only by establishing and then
appealing to a "higher" authority accounts, I suspect, for the
prevailing impetus to pose the question "Which mode of analysis comes first, moral rights or consequences?" Cast in these
terms the problem appears to be both intractable6 and reminiscent of the paradox "Which comes first, the chicken or the
egg?" Viewed hierarchically, the chicken-egg problem-involving real chickens and their eggs-is also intractable. Neither
can come first because, paradoxically, both need to come first.
In this Foreword, I will explore the possibility that it is useful
to analyze problems pertaining to law from both a moral rights
and a consequentialist perspective; that each of these competing modes of analysis complements the other, notwithstanding
the fact that one mode will sometimes conflict with the other;
that the mode of analysis associated with traditional "natural
rights" theories contains both a moral rights and a consequentialist component; and that, just as both chickens and eggs are
vital components of a process of biological evolution, moral
rights and consequentialist analyses are vital components of a
process of legal evolution-a process that includes both elements of change and elements of stability. 7
3. See H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 10 (1983) ("Perhaps the most distinctive
characteristic of the Western legal tradition is the coexistence and competition within
the same community of diverse jurisdictions and diverse legal systems."): L. FULLER,
supra note 2, at 123 ("(M]ultiple [legal] systems [governing the same population] do
exist and have in history been more common than unitary systems.").
4. L FuLLER, supra note 2, at 111.
5. See id. at 233.
6. See Alexander, Comment: &rsonal Projects and Impersonal Rights, 12 HARv.j.L & PuB.
PoL'Y 813, 825 (1989) ("All of these philosophical debates have proven intractable
•.•").See gmerally Fletcher, Par~ in Legal Thought, 85 CoLUM. L REV. 1263 (1985).
7. The existence of constant change does not preclude the existence of comparative
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DEFINING TERMS

Let me begin by clarifying my terms. In the l~gal context,
both moral rights and consequentialist analyses are used to discern when one person or group may properly use force against
another person or group-including the enforcement authorized by legal institutions. Moral rights are typically viewed as
describing claims to enforcement based solely on the protected
interests of individuals or discrete groups. Once the scope of
these protect~d interests is defined, any interference with these
interests is· said to be a violation of the rights of the person or
group. On this view, the use of force is justified-either presumptively (prima facie) or absolutely-to prevent or rectify
such a rights violation. Conversely, if an action is consistent
with moral rights, for~e may not jusdy be used to prevent or
alter it.
In contrast, a consequential analysis typically judges the merits of using legal force by the consequences such actions are
likely to have for everyone in a particular society. Consequentialist analysis deems an action legally permissible if the beneficial consequences of permitting the action (less the harm
caused by such actions) exceed the beneficial consequences of
prohibiting it (less the harm. caused by legal prohibition). Conversely, an action is deemed to be subject to legal prohibition
when the net harmful consequences of permitting the action
exceed the net harmful consequences of prohibiting it.
In jurisprudence, arguments from ·~ustice" based on rights
are sometimes considered to be matters of principle, while arguments from "utility" based on legal consequences are often
referred to as matters ofpolicy.8 Those who doubt the value of
any moral rights analysis are likely to assert that a change in the
law exclusively reflects policy preferences and that courts are
less competent than legislatures to render such "utilitarian"
judgments. Even among those who accept the value of a moral
rights analysis, the competency of courts to evaluate conduct
continuity. See Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J. LEe. STUD. 253
(1980). An adequate evolutionary account oflaw must explain both. The collective use
and evolution of concepts is examined in great detail in 1 S. ToULMIN, HuMAN UNDERSTANDING (1972). Much of the account presented here is informed by Toulmin's
approach.
'8. Cj. R. DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90 (1977) ("Arguments of principle
are arguments intended to establish an individual right; arguments of policy are arguments intended to establish a collective goal.").
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according to some set of moral rights is controversial. 9
Let me emphasize that these definitions greatly simplify a
very long and very rich debate over the true contents of the two
approaches. Indeed, in recent years thinkers on each side of the
gulf between rights and consequences have taken strides to reduce the gulf that divides them. 10 Despite the undeniable sophistication of these approaches, however, it is the simple, not
the complex, conceptions of t4ese ideas that are persistently
used to demonstrate the alleged incompatibility of rights and
consequences. The appeal of examples such as those discussed
above, 11 lies precisely in their ability to reduce the moral rights
and consequentialist positions to the simple tenets I have just
sketched so that the paradoxical question-which comes first,
rights or consequences?-cannot be avoided.
What would it mean .to claim that moral rights and consequentialist analyses are compatible? To the extent that adherents to mofal rights or 'C:onsequentialism are committed to a
reliance on qne of these modes of analysis to the complete exclusion of the other, these philosophies are truly and hopelessly incompatible. Consider this description by, philosopher J.
L. Mackie of.the difference between rights-based and utilitarian
analyses:
The fundamental point of contrast, and conflict, between
utilitariaJ1 and rights-based views is that the former, at least
in their basic theory, aggregate the interests or preferences
of all the persons or parties who are being taken into account, whereas the latter insist, to the end, on the separateness of persons..... ·
Of course this does not mean that a utilitarian must literally deny that persons are separate, or that any utilitarian has
ever done so. What it means is that this separateness does no
work in the utilitarian method of determining what is good
or just, that in the utilitarian calculus the desires, or the satis9. Cf McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 CH1.-KENT L.
REV. 89, IOO (I988) ("To say that there are principles of natural right is not to say that
judges have the immediate power to enforce them."). Note that in his article, Professor
McConnell consistently refers to "natural right" rather than the historically distinct
approach to justice based on natural rights. For a brief description of the difference, see
Mack, Comment: A Costly Road to Natural Law, I2 liARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 753, 754-56
(I989) (distinguishing between classical theories of natural law or natural right and
modern theories of natural rights).
IO. See UTILITY AND RIGHTS (R.G. Frey ed. I984); Alexander, Pursuing the Good-Indi·
rectly, 95 ETHICS 3I5 (I985); Gray, Indirect Utility and Fundamental Rights, Soc. PHIL. &
PoL'Y, Spring I984, at 73; Laycock, The Ultimate Unity of Rights and Utilities, 64 TEX. L.
REv. 407 (I985).
II. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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factions, of different individuals are all weighed together in
the way in which a single thoroughly rational egoist would
weigh together all his own· desires or satisfactions: on a utilitarian view, transferring a satisfaction from one 'person to
another, while pr~serving its magnitude, makes no morally
significant difference. 12
Reconciling these positions would be like squaring the circle.
Showing that moral rights and consequences were equ!ll partners within the legal enterprise would constitute a rejection,
not a reconciliation, of these two views. A showing of compatibility would not, however, be a rejection of the central values or
core concerns-protecting rights and achieving beneficial consequences--of each of these philosophies. To the contrary, it
would simultaneously affirm both core concerns as opposed to
one or the other and would try to show how and why each has
an important role to play in the legal enterprise.
A truly "compatibilist"-to use Christopher Wonnell's helpful term 15-account of these core concerns requires more than
a showing that moral rights and consequentialist analyses reach
the same results in most cases. The argument that moral rights
are justified on utilitarian grounds-as both Richard Epstein
and Christopher Wonnell argue in their contributions to this
symposium 14--operates well within the dominant hierarchical
approach. Rather than trying to justify one mode of analysis in
terms of the other, a truly compatibilist approach would, in my
view, try to show how moral rights and consequentialist modes
of analysis can both be useful components of a more comprehensive evaluative method. Nonetheless, if it is true that in
most cases a sound moral rights analysis converges on much
the same results as a sound consequentialist analysis, such a
showing would suggest two important respects in which moral
rights and consequentialist analyses are functionally
compatible.
First, if both methods generally reach the same result in en12. Mackie, Rights, .Utility, and Universalization in Um.I'IY AND RIGIITS, supra note 10, at
86-87. As Jeremy Waldron points out, utilitarianism is just one kind of consequentialist
analysis. See Waldron, Comment: Wonnell on Rights and E.ffo:iencJ, 12 HARv. J.L. & PuB.
PoL'Y 873, 874 (1989) ("Some rights may embody the indirect pursuit of good consequences • • . . Others may represent a commitment to a particular consequence taken
to be specially important in itself.") (footnote omitted).
13. See Wonnell, Four Challmges Facing a Compatibilist Philosophy, 12 HARV. J.L. & PuB.
PoL'Y 836 (1989).
14. See Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HARv.J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y
713 (1989); Wonnell, supra note 13.
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tirely different ways, then each method can provide an analytic
check on the other. Because any of our analytic methods may
err or may be used to deceive, we can use one method to confirm the results that appear to be supported by the other. Analogously, after adding a column of figures from top to bottom,
we sometimes double check the sum by adding the figures
again from bottom to top or by using a calculator. Just as we
rely upon institutional rivalries between branches of government to protect against error and deception, we may rely upon
"conceptual rivalries" between different methods of normative
inquiry for the same reason. In sum, one way that moral rights
and consequentialist modes of analysis may be functionally
compatible is by providing a conceptual "checks and balances"
mechanism by which errors in our normative analysis may be
detected and prevented.
Second, only if we rely upon multiple modes of analysis can
we assess the degree of confidence we should have in a conclusion recommended by any single mode of analysis. Because we
know that no evaluative method is infallible, the more valid
methods there are that point in the same direction, the more
confident we may be that this is the direction in which to move.
Conversely, a divergence of results between two valid methods
suggests problems that may exist at the level of application of a
method or deep inside the method itself. Divergent results
from competing methodologies recommend not only that we
proceed cautiously, but that we carefully reconsider our methods and their application to discover, if possible, the source of
the divergence. 15 In sum, a second way that an analysis of both
moral rights and consequences may be functionally compatible
is that only when we rely on competing modes of analysis can
convergence of results beget confidence and divergence of results stimulate discovery.
The ability of two completely different methods to reach the
same results in most cases suggests that each method is grasping, however imperfectly, something "real" about the world it
is seeking to explain. If each method were unrelated to any fundamental reality, we would expect only a random convergence
of results. To put the matter less metaphysically, considering
how different moral rights and consequentialist analyses are
15. I consider two examples of such divergence in Barnett, FOTtUJord: The Ninth
Amendment and Constitutional legitimacy, 64 CHI.·KENT L. REv. 37, 44-46 (1988).
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from each other, only if both methods have an underlying validity would they so frequendy converge on the same results. 16
Perhaps by better understanding the merits of each methodology we can begin to unravel the rights-consequences paradox.
THE APPEAL OF

MoRAL

RIGHTs AND

CoNSEQ.UENTIALIST ANALYSES

To resolve any paradox we must take several steps back from
the analytic framework that produced it. We have taken the first
step by suggesting why most schools of thought have felt impelled to adopt either moral rights or consequences as their
.exclusive mode of analysis or have elevated one of these to the
top of a hierarchical analysis. A hierarchy provides a way of
resolving conflicts between the two modes of analysis and
avoids the apparent need to balance two competing values. The
next step is to examine why some gravitate to moral rights analysis while others are attracted to consequentialism. I suspect
that adherents to one school or the other are attracted to the
different truths that lie at the core of each evaluative method
and that the preference for one method as opposed to the
other depends upon the priority one attaches to these truths.
Moral rights analysis is appealing because it takes seriously
the individual and the associations to which individuals belong.
Moral rights are seen as protecting the highly valued "private"
sphere. 17 Put another way, moral rights analysis views the actions of individuals and associations from the perspective of the
individual and the association. The specialized evaluative techniques it employs are conducive to elaborating this perspective.
Because we all are individuals and members of associations, the
idea of moral rights has wide appeal. We have a natural interest
16. Loren Lomasky has suggested to me another possible explanation of this pur·
poned convergence: it is bogus. One analytic method is simply taking a free ride on the
other. Either natural rights thinkers are doing seat-of-the-pants consequentialist calculation or consequentialists are seeking to justify just those rights that have come to be
accepted as imponant on moral grounds. Although this possibility is wonh serious
consideration, in the balance of this Foreword I will assume that, when it occurs, the
convergence of moral rights and consequentialist analyses is genuine.
17. Ste l..omasky,supra note 1, at 777 (arguing that rights are powerful because "they
erect morally potent barriers that others are not at Iibeny to cross even if there are
otherwise cogent reasons supponing such encroachment"); see also Waldron, When juslice Replaas Affiction: The Need for Rights, 11 HARv.j.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 625 (1988) ("[11he
structure of rights is not constitutive of social life, but instead [is] to be understood as a
position of fallback and security in case other constituent elements of social relations
ever come apan.").
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in the protection of our rights, and our empathy causes us also
to be concerned about the protection of the rights of others.
In contrast, consequential analysis is appealing because it
takes seriously the wide-reaching and highly dispersed effects
that the actions of individuals and associations may often have
on others. Consequential analysis is seen as protecting a "public" sphere. Although consequential analysis is often couched
in terms of how "society" views the actions of the individual
and association, one can avoid this anthropomorphic metaphor
by saying that consequential analysis views the actions of individuals and associations from the perspective of the other persons with whom they live in society} 8 The specialized
evaluative techniques it employs are conducive to elaborating
this perspective. Because we are all affected by the actions of
other individu;lls and associations of which we are not members, the consequentialist perspective also has wide appeal. We
are concerned about the consequences to us of other persons'
actions and our empathy causes us also to be concerned about
the consequences of such actions for others.
Viewed in this light both moral rights and consequentialist
analyses provide personal reasons for action. 19 At the risk of
oversimplification, moral rights attempt to define a privileged
sphere within which each person can act; consequential analysis
attempts to gauge the effects that such privileged actions have
on each person. At some point, however, both of these perspectives lose their appeal. Moral right_s analysis is unappealing
when it advocates the protection of moral rights "though the
heavens may fall. " 20 Most people care about the domain of discretionary actions that rights protect, but also would care about
the falling of the heavens. Consequentialist analysis is unappealing when it sacrifices the domain of action protected by
moral rights in the interest of a completely impersonal standard of value-utils, wealth maximization, etc. Most people do
18. Ardent communitarians who believe in a "public" entity and a "public good"
above and apart from the persons and association in a given society are probably not
consequentialists, so this recasting of consequentialism away from the "society-as-a
sentient-entity" metaphor should not greatly disturb them.
19. The issue of personal and impersonal reasons for action is discussed in Alexander, supra note 6, at 815-17; Lomasky, supra note I, at 781-94; and Mack, supra note 9,
at 756-59.
20. See Epstein, supra note 14, at 713 ("[I]f consequences never count, then disastrous consequences cannot count either."); Lomasky, supra note 1, at 777 ("The willingness to countenance acceptance of the inferior [outcome] may be seen as the
epitome of practical irrationality.").
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not want to sacrifice all of their liberty to act even if such sacrifices significantly benefit others.
The paradox of rights and consequences, of justice and utility, may be viewed as an aspect of the alleged paradox of classical liberalism. On the one hand, in contrast with political
elitism, liberalism sought to protect the dignity of the common
person, meaning all persons qua human beings. On the other
hand, liberalism always acknowledged the need to prevent the
actions of some from adversely affecting the interests of others.
Nor did individualist-flavored liberalism ever deny the importance of the community in which individuals reside. Liberalism
always lay betwixt and between these two great concerns, a 'position that has led some critics of liberalism to complain of its
internal dialectic, inherent tensions, or fundamental contradictions. It would be mistaken to conclude that this undeniable
tension betWeen individual and community, between self and
others, is a contradiction in a logical sense. Aristode, no stranger to logic (albeit aristotelian), held that virtue consisted in
seeking the mean between extremes.21 Far from representing a
middle-of-the-road position,22 liberalism, like aristotelian virtue, attempts to supply a conceptual and institutional structure
that is exquisitely poised between the individual and others-a
structure that is scrutinized from the perspective of both rights
and consequences.
Given the impossibility of assessing the merits of each person's ev~ry action, the conceptual or intellectual aspect of the
liberal endeavor must be able to assess types of human action
from the perspective of the actor as well as from the perspective of those who are affected by these actions. Moral rights
concepts and a consequential analysis of these concepts reflect
these different perspectives. The institutional setting__ in which
these concepts are developed and used must ensure that both
perspectives are adequately represented.
Those actions that pass muster from both points of view-or
neither-are "easy cases" in which we can be quite confident in
21. See L FUllER, THE PROBLEMS OF jURISPRUDENCE 31 (tent. ed. 1949)-("[T]he cen;
tral notion that virtue is a state of balance between forces that pull a man in different
directions is one of the most important and fruitful parts of Aristotle's ethical
thought.").
22. See id. ("For Aristotle, the middle. way was not the soft way, but the hard way, the
way that took skill and competence and from which the clumsy and ill-favored were
most likely to fall.").
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our judgment. The actions about which justice and expediency
provide conflicting assessments, such as the hypotheticals
given earlier, 23 are "hard cases" that call upon us to reconsider
our analysis or further refine our analytic techniques. Until
such time as a conflict between modes of analysis is resolved,
we must tread cautiously, and the fact that caution is required is
worth knowing. Indeed, one of the greatest virtues of moral
rights analysis is its ability to obviate the need for costly and
potentially tragic "social experiments" that may be recommended by faulty consequentialist analyses. 24 Even when such
experiments are destructive, there is often no efficient way to
terminate them. It is far better to use a moral rights analysis to
look before one leaps. 25
Still, the fact that we must act in the face of conflicting modes
of analysis suggests that the compatibilist picture I have
painted to this point is still seriously incomplete. How is it that
we· are not frozen in our tracks until conflicts between moral
rights and consequentialist perspectives are resolved? Perhaps
there is yet another mechanism of choice that functions alongside analyses of rights and consequences. Understanding the
nature of this mechanism and its relationship to moral rights
and consequentialist analyses will further help resolve the paradoxical relationship of these two competing techniques.
THE MisSING LINK: LEGAL EvoLUTION AND THE RuLE OF

LAw

I have suggested that types of human action should be assessed from the perspective of the actor and also from the perspective of those affected by the action and that these
perspectives are represented by analyses of moral rights and
consequences. However, the compatible roles of these competing modes of analysis cannot be fully appreciated without considering the shortcomings of any analytic technique, whether
that of moral rights or that of consequentialism.
The rhetoric of philosophers and economists would lead one
to think that a comprehensive analysis of moral rights or a com23. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
24. I have argued elsewhere that the legal prohibition of intoxicating drugs is one
example of this. See Barnett, Curing the Drug-Law Addition: The Harmful Side Efficts of Legal
ProhibitUm, in DEALING WITH DRUGS 73 (R. Hamowy ed. 1987).
25. See Barnett, Public Decisions and Private Rights (book review), CRJM. juST. Ennes,
Summer-Fall 1984, ·at 50 (discussing the inherent weaknesses of public policy analysis
unguided by moral rights).
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prehensive analysis of consequences was capable of discovering
the full panoply of norms on which law should be based. But
neither mode of analysis can accomplish such a feat. Instead,
both rights theorists and consequentialists get their starting
points from conventional practice.26 In the Anglo-American
legal systems, the conventions of practice have typically been
generated by the spontaneously evolving process known as the
common law.27 As Lon Fuller put it,
[i]t can be said that law is the oldest and richest of the social
sciences.. : . Economists who have exhausted the resources
of their own science turn to the law for insight into the nature of the institutional arrangements essential for a free
economy. Philosophers find in the law a discipline lacking in
their own sometimes errant studies-the discipline, namely,
that comes of accepting the responsibility for rendering deci.
sions by which men··can shape their lives.28

Although he uses a hierarchical metaphor, Charles Fried has
made a similar observation:
The picture I have ... is of philosophy proposing an elaborate structure of arguments and considerations that descend
from on high but stop some twenty feet above the ground. It
is the peculiar task of the law to complete this structure of
ideals alld values, to bring it down to earth; and to complete
it so that it is firmly and concretely seated, so that it shelters
real hUJilan beings against the storms of passion and conflict.
Now that last twenty feet may not be the most glamorous
part of the building-it is the part where the plumbing and
utilities are housed. But it is an indispensable part. The lofty
philosophical edifice does not determine what the last twenty
feet are, yet if the legal foundation is to support the whole,
then ideals and values must constrain, limit, inform, and inspire the foundation-but no more. The law is really an independent, distinct part of the structure of value. 29

That philosophical and economic analyses are typically used
to subject established conventional principles to critical scrutiny is of methodological significance. It suggests that, even
taken together, moral rights and consequentialist analyses cannot explain the discovery oflegal norms that would satisfy their
26. The mechanism by which conventional norms spontaneously evolve is discussed
in R. SuGDEN, THE EcoNOMics OF RIGHTS, Co-oPERATION AND WELFARE (1986).
27. See L. Fuu.ER, .ANATOMY oF nu: LAw 84-108 (1968) (presenting ten distinctive
characteristics of the common-law process).
~8. /d. at S.
29. Fried, Rights and 1M Common Law, in UTILnY AND RIGHTS, supra note 10, at 231.
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critical demands. It suggests that moral rights and consequentialist analyses are just a part of how legal norms are discovered. Something more is required. Two years ago in this space
I suggested that the attempt to discover legal norms depends
upon both tradition and reason. 30 Tradition provides us with a
starting point-that is, a set of conventional norms that must
then be subjected to critical reason. This observation may seem
both obvious and hopelessly vague. The discussion to follow
should render this approach more useful and more specific.
Moral rights and consequentialism are modes of rational
analysis that are quite useful to criticize the "received" or traditional wisdom. Unlike philosophers or economists, however,
judges must decide cases even in the absence of an iron-clad
moral rights or consequentialist analysis. Indeed, for most of
our legal history there was little such rational analysis available
at all. The need to resolve a multitude of real disputes, each
with its own peculiar facts, is the engine that drives legal evolution forward. 31 This engine produces a body of reported outcomes of countless cases in which contending parties have both
laid claim to some resource (including the resource that would
be used to satisfy a monetary damage award) and the reasons
given by judges' for these outcomes (as well as dissenting and
concurring judicial opinions). From this diverse body of outcomes and reasons emerge dominant conventions-sometimes
called the "majority rule•'-and other rival conventions that
may be called the "minority rule." 32 For example, the law of
undisclosed agency developed in spite of, rather than because
of, the prevailing theories of contractual obligation. 33 Yet most
theorists who were puzzled by this "anomaly" were nonetheless generally in agreement with its content.
Once discovered by legal institutions, these evolved rules
may then be subjected to critical reason in the form of a mixture of moral rights and consequentialist analysis. Yet, for the
30. See Barnett, Foreword: judicial Conservatism v. A Principled judicial Activism, 10 HARV.
j.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 273, 281-86 (1987).
31. That the imperative of deciding actual cases leads to a distinctive and indispensable mode of analysis is explored in great detail in A. joNSEN & S. TOULMIN, THE
ABUSE OF CAsUISTRY (1988).
32. See L. FuLLER, supra note 27, at 93-94 (discussing the constructive role that conflicting opinions play in the generation of legal norms).
33. See Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency With Contract Theory, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1969,
2000-03 (1988) (discussing the law of undisclosed agency as an example of a spontaneously developed body of doctrine that is consistent with a rights analysis).
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traditional conventions produced by the adjudicative process to
provide more than a random starting point for a critical analysis based on moral rights and consequences, it is. not enough
that cases just be resolved. The way disputes are rel?olved determines whether the results reached by a legal system can evolve
into promising conventional standards of right conduct that
can then be subjected to and, in the main, survive the normative scrutiny of critical reason based on moral.rights and· consequentialist analysis. Only if the processes that resolve disputes
do so in certain ways can we take the views we ;receive from
these processes as a form of wisdom. Similarly, the way that
legislation is enacted either supports or undermines the likelihood that such legislation is substantively legitimate.34 The
form that enables dispute resolution processes to produce
'Judgments" that are ·knowledgeable enough to usually withstand critical scrutiny on the basis of moral rights or consequences can be summarized under the rubric, "the rule oflaw."
The best summary of these formal constraints was provided by
Lon Fuller. 35 He called these constraints the "internal morality
of law."36 Decisions made according to the formal standards
provided by the rule of law are capable of producing an elaborate set of decisions consisting of both results (the facts of the
case plus who won) and articulated rationales for the results.
When a sufficiently elaborate set of decisions (results and rationales) has developed it becomes possible to subject this set of
practices to systematic rational appraisal-including the appraisal provided by what Fuller termed the "external morality
oflaw."37
M. Stt Barnett, supra note 15, at 47-64.
85. Ste L. Fuu.ER;supra note 2, at 38-39 (listing eight formal characteristics oflegality); Fuller, The Fonns and limits ofAdjudicatifm, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353 (19~8) (discussing
the formal requirements. of adjudication).
36. L. FullER, supra note 2, at 96.
What I have called the internal morality of law is in this sense a procedural
version. of natural law, though to avoid misunderstanding the word "procedural" should be assigned a special and expanded sense so that it would include, for example, a substantive accord between official action and enacted
law. The term "procedural" is, however, broadly appropriate as indicating
that we are concerned, not with the substantive aims of legal rules, but with
the ways in which a system of rules for governing human conduct must be
constructed and administered if it is to be efficacious .and at the same time
remain what it purports to be.
/d. at 96-97.
37. /d. at 96.
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THE LEGAL ENTERPRISE AND THE PROBLEM
oF "SociAL ORDER"

At this point one can expect the following response from philosophers: although you say that moral rights and consequentialist modes of analysis are both useful ways of improving
upon past practices that have evolved as part of a process governed by the rule of law, you have not identified your criterion
or criteria of improvement. Although you say that the concepts
that are the product of legal evolution according to the rule of
law must serve the proper ends of the legal enterprise, you
have not identified what these ends are. Unless we know the
standard by which improvement is to be measured, how can we
say that either method improves upon current practices? Unless we know the ends of the legal system, how can we know
they are being served? To answer the question of ends, the
argument proceeds, requires a choice between the normative
standard ofjustice based on moral rights or the normative standard of utility based on the maximization of beneficial consequences. In making this choice we cannot escape the essential
incompatibility of rights and consequences. Ultimately, one approach must be subordinate to the other~
Although I concede that some idea of "improvement" is
needed to appreciate the roles played by moral rights, consequential analysis, and the iule of law, I reject the idea that our
conception of improvement need be based exclusively on any
one of these three perspectives. 38 All three approaches are
problem-solving devices. Viewed in this light all of these modes
of analysis are means, not ends. 39 To provide the requisite idea
of improvement, one must identify, not so much an ultimate
standard of value, but the ultimate problem that the enterprise of
law with its particular blend of formal and substantive values is
seeking to solve. We can then see how traditional processes
based on the rule of law and such rational modes of analysis as
those provided by moral rights and consequentialist methods
38. In this essay I have not considered the views of some that the rule of law is the
ultimate source of norms, a view that today is associated with many judicial conserva·
tives. I did briefly discuss this approach in Barnett, Foreword: Can justice and the Rult of
Law Be Reconciltd1, 11 HARv.j.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 599 (1988).
.
39. Set L. FULLER, Means and Ends, in PRINCIPLES OF SoCIAL ORDER 47 (K. Winston
ed. 1980) (discussing the contextual nature of the distinction between means and
ends).
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all contribute to solving the relevant problem.40 Moreover,
other processes and methods of rational analysis may be useful
as well.41
To sum up the analysis thus far, the first step toward resolving the paradox of rights and consequences was to reject the
hierarchical approach to rights and consequences and to entertain the prospect that both were equal partners in the legal enterprise. The second step was to appreciate why each mode of
analysis is attractive. The third step was to acknowledge the
role that an evolving tradition or practice governed by formal
criteria known as .the rule of law plays in providing cases and
promising precepts that can be subjected to rational scrutiny
on the basis of rights and consequences. The next step is to
identify the underlying function or end of the legal enterprise
so that we can better recognize moral and consequential methods that contribute to the improvement of the precepts produced by institutions governed by the rule oflaw. We need to
discern the problem or problems for which moral rights, consequentialist analysis, and the rule of law are offered as solutions.
According to classical liberals, the fundamental problem facing every society may be summarized as follows: Given that the
actions of each person in society are likely to have efficts on others, on
what conditions is it possible for persons to live and pursue happiness in
society with other persons? "Social order" is the term that has traditionally been used to describe the state of affairs that permits
every person to live and pursue happiness in society with
others.42 Unfortunately, this term has come to be associated
40. Cf. S. ToULMIN, supra note 7, at 185:
Within a historically developing scientific enterprise, ... the significance of
our concepts can be adequately shown •.. only by viewing all the elements of
the science-subject-matter, formal entailments, explanatory procedures, and
all-within a larger framework, and by demonstrating how_.,n what conditions, in what kinds of case, and with.what degree of precision-the explanatory procedures and/or arguments within which the concept is given a
meaning can successfully be used to make sense of the relevant subjectmatter.
·
41. Rational bargaining theory, for example, is an example of a distinctive technique
that intersects both moral rights and consequential analyses. See, e.g., Coleman, Heckathorn & Maser, A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in
Contract Law, 12 HARv.J.L & PuB. PoL'Y 639 (1989).
42. F.A. Hayek offers the following definition of the general concept of "order":
[A] state of affairs in which a multiplicity of elements of various kinds are so
related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance with some
spacial or temporal part of the whole to form correct expectations concerning
the rest, or at least expectations which have a good chance of proving correct.
I F.A. HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 36 (1973).
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with ordering schemes imposed from above by totalitarian regimes.43 For this reason, perhaps, the term "coordination" better captures the problem of achieving an "order of actions." 44
Whatever the terminology, some way must be found to permit
persons to act so that their actions do not obstruct the actions
of others.
This rendition of the fundamental problem of human society
contains a number of "liberal" presuppositions. First, liberals
recognize the existence and value of individual persons. Second, liberals place value on the ability of all persons to live and
pursue ··happiness. Third, liberals use the phrase "pursuit of
happiness" because they reject the idea that one particular
style of life is to be preferred above all others for everyone.
Fourth, liberals recognize that people live in society with others
and that the actions of one may have both positive and negative
effects on others. Fifth, liberals maintain that it is possible to
find conditions or ground rules that would provide all or nearly
all persons living in society the opportunity to pursue happiness without depriving others of the same opportunity.
Of course, although they are widely shared, each of these
presuppositions is and has always been controversial. For this
reason, liberalism is and has always been controversial. Where
controversy arises over any of these presuppositions, it must be
thrashed out in the appropriate forum. Assuming, however,
that a consensus is reached on these presuppositions, then the
next step is to ask how it is that the problem of achieving coordination is actually to be solved. In the next section, I shall suggest the role that natural rights play in addressing this
problem.
RESOLVING THE PARADOX: THE NATURAL RIGHTS ALTERNATIVE

The term "natural rights" means many things to many people, and I shall not try to compare my conception with that of
others. Indeed, given the many preconceptions about natural
rights, it may well be best to abandon the term altogether. Current prejudices notwithstanding, however, the natural rights
43. See id. at 35 ("The term 'order' has, of course, a long history in the social sciences, ••• but in recent times it has generally been avoided, largely because of the
ambiguity of its meaning and its frequent association with authoritarian views. We can·
not do without it, however .•..").
44. See id. at 98-101 (discussing the role played by legal institutions in maintaining
"an ongoing order of actions.").
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tradition has much of value to offer and it would be disingenuous to adopt a natural rights methodology without giving the
tradition its due.
For present purposes it is enough to identify two significa~t
features of natural rights thinking. First, writers in the classical
natural rights tradition were attempting to address in a realistic
manner the problem of social order. Sometimes they referred
to this as the "common good," referring not to some· public
good that transcends the persons living in society with others,
but to those basic requirements that all such persons share in
common.45 Second, they addressed this problem with a mixture of what we would today consider moral rights and consequentialist analyses.46
Let me briefly summarize the liberal approach to natural
rights.47 When living "in society with others, humans need to
.act. Their actions will require the use of physical resources, including their bodies but, because of scarcity, their actions will
unavoidably affect others. Given that nearly all human action
will affect others in some way, how are actions to be regulated
so as to permit individuals to act in pursuit of happiness without impeding the similar pursuit by others? To answer this, a
natural rights approach attempts to establish an appropriate
time and place for the actions of different persons by examining certain features of the world that are common to all, at least
under circumstances we would consider to be normal. Normal
circumstances give rise to precepts (rules and principles) that
45. Cf. D. HuME, A TREATISE oF HuMAN NATURE 484 (L Selby-Bigge &: P. Nidditch
2d ed. 1978) (1st ed. 1739-1740):
Tho' the rules of justice be arlijicial, they are not arbitrary. Nor is the expression improper to call them Laws of Nature; if by natural we understand what is
common to any species, or even if we confine it to mean what is inseparable
from the species.
.
46. Because a strict dichotomy between rights and consequences had yet to solidifY,
these writers often moved from one mode of analysis to the other with little warning.
For this reason, contemporary analysts committed to an unbridgeable dichotomy are
likely to arrive at starkly conflicting interpretations of classical writings in the natural
rights tradition depending upon which of the two dimensions of natural rights analysis
is stressed. Compare Miller, Economic E.fficiency and the Loclcean Proviso, 10 HARv. J.L. &:
PuB. PoL'Y 401 (1987) (attributing to Locke a utilitarian approach) with Valcke, Loclce on
Property: A Phwsophicallnterpretation, 12 HARv.J.L. &: Pus. PoL'Y 941 (1989) (attributing
·to Locke a moral rights approach). According to a compatibilist approach, both these
interpretations can be useful to understand Locke's theory of naturill rights, except
insofar as each interpretation denies the validity of the other.
4 7. I have presented a more elaborate application of this method in Barnett, Pursuing
justice in a Free Society: Part One-Powerv. Liberty, CRIM.jUST. Ennes, Summer-Fall1985,
at 50.
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presumptively govern time and place unless it can be shown
that extraordinary circumstances exist that would support the
creation of an exception-itself defeasible-to the rule. 48 The
contours of this scheme of defeasible precepts and exceptions
define in general terms the natural rights of all persons-rights
that are not themselves normally defeasible.
The basic precepts produced at this stage are quite abstract.
For persons to live and pursue happiness in society with others,
persons need to act at their own discretion. This is made possible by recognizing a sphere of jurisdiction over physical resources~including their own bodies-that provides persons
with discretionary control-liberty-over these resources. Put
another way, persons need to be at liberty to act within the
realm of their jurisdiction-a jurisdiction that has both temporal and spatial dimensions.
The shorthand term for this jurisdiction is "property rights,"
with property given its older meaning of "proprietorship."
One is said to have property in an object or one's body.49 Property, in this sense, refers not to an object, but to a right to control physical resources-a right that cannot normally be
displaced without the consent or wrongful conduct of the right
holder. Some of these property rights are alienable and others
are inalienable. 50 Persons need to be able to consensually
tqmsfer their alienable rights or jurisdiction to others. 51 The
shorthand term for this precept is "freedom of contract."
Persons also need institutions that enable them to enforce
their rights, but these institutions must be subject to substantive and procedural constraints to ensure that the institutions
whose mission it is to protect rights do not end up violating
them. The substantive constraints are provided by the general
48. The historical practice of using presumptive precepts within different stages of
analysis and the vinues of this technique are discussed in Epstein, Pkading and PresumptionJ, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 556 (1973); see also Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonabk, 98
HARv. L REv. 949 (1985) (distinguishing between "flat" and "structured" modes of
legal analysis). I have used this method to resolve some vexing issues of contract theory
and doctrine in Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLUM. L REv. 269, 309-10,
318 (1986) [hereinafter Barnett, A Consent Theory]; see also Barnett, supra note 33, at
1993-99.
49. See, e.g.,J. LocKE, An Essay Concerning The True Origin Extent and End of Civil Government, in Two TREATISES OF CML GOVERNMENT, ch. V, § 27 (London 1690) ("every man
has a property in his own pmon").
50. See Barnett, Contract Remedies and Ina/ienabk Rights, Soc. PHIL. & PoL'Y, Autumn
1986, at 179 (discussing the bases of inalienable rights and the implication of inalienability for contract remedies).
51. &e Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 48, at 291-309.
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precepts of justice governing the acquisition, use, and transfer
of resources. The procedural constraints are provided by the
set of principles sometimes referred to as the rule oflaw.
A natural rights analysis does not rest content with generating a set of substantive and procedural precepts of justice and
the rule of law from general observations about the nature of
the human condition. It also "tests" the conclusions such an
analysis provides by examining the consequences of adhering
to these precepts. This may be done hypothetically or empirically. If it is revealed that a particular form of jurisdiction actually retards rather than enhances the ability of persons to
pursue happiness in society, this showing does not automatically refute the rights being scrutinized. Instead, the analysis
must return to the legal precepts used to elaborate moral rights
to see if the original precept can be refined to better deal with
the problem or if an entirely different precept would be better.
Such a process seeks what John Rawls has called a "reflective
equilibrium"52 among competing considerations.
Let me offer an example to illustrate this multifaceted approach. The liberal natural rights analysis just presented suggests that the consent of the rights-holder lies at the heart of
contractual obligation. 58 In practice, courts developed the
"doctrine of consideration," which requires commitments to be
"bargained for" to be enforceable.54 Although this criterion of
enforceability captures most consensual commitments to alienate rights, it gradually became apparent that this precept was
underinclusive. That is, it left unenforced a variety of "serious"
commitments on which people are likely to rely to their detriment-cases that came to be clustered under the rubric of
"promissory estoppel. " 55
However, merely identifying a residual group of cases that
seemed to be unsatisfactorily handled by the doctrine of bargained-for consideration neither solves the problem nor en52. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF jusncE 48-50 (1970).
53. See Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 48 (describing a "consent theory of
contract").
54. See RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS§ 71(1), (2) (1979):
(I) To constitute consideration, a performance or return promise must be
bargained for.
(2) A performance or return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the
promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.
55. See Barnett, A Consent Theory, supra note 48, at 287-89.
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sures that there is a genuine problem to be solved. Without
some other analysis we cannot be sure that the source of our
intuitive dissatisfaction does not lie in our intuitions rather
than in the doctrine of consideration. When these aberrant
cases are considered in light of a moral rights analysis, however, it becomes clear that, although they lack bargained-for
commitments, many of these cases nonetheless involve some
other manifestation of consent to be legally bound. From this
observation we can begin to suspect that bargained-for consideration should not be the exclusive means of establishing a
consensual transfer of rights. Other indicia of consent, such as
a formality or even silence in the face of substantial reliance,
may also indicate the presence of consent. 56
This example illustrates how the rule of law and a natural
rights approach to justice based on an analysis of both moral
rights and consequences can work together. The institutions
governed by the rule oflaw developed a doctrine of bargainedfor consideration to help distinguish between enforceable and
unenforceable· commitments. Although this legal precept was
not logically deduced from first principles of justice, it was
nonetheless consistent with and justified by a moral rights analysis insofar as it was a generally efficacious method of determining the existence of consent to alienate rights. As this
precept came increasingly to dominate contract law, however,
certain unbargained-for, but consensual, commitments went
unenforced. Dissatisfaction with this consequence of the doctrine stimulated a reexamination of the legal precept in light of
a moral rights analysis. This critical analysis revealed the limitations of the doctrine of consideration and recommended ways
by which the precepts governing contract law could be
reformed.
THE RIGHT

AND THE GooD

In my view, the moral rights and consequentialist components of a natural rights approach support a view of rights as
spheres of bounded individual and associational discretion to
use physical resources. Rights allow persons and associations
jurisdiction to decide how certain physical resources-includ56. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Barnett &: Becker, Beyond Relianct:
Promissory Eswppt~ Contract Fonnalities, and Misrtjmsentation, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 443
(1987).
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ing their own bodies-should be used. Such jurisdiction is
bounded, and the boundaries must be enforced by institutions
governed by the rule of law. These institutions, in turn, produce the cases and decisions that lead to important refinements
of our understanding of the basic precepts of justice. Legal
evolution requires a constant rotation among these modes of
analysis-the rule oflaw and justice based on both moral rights
and consequentialist analyses-and others as well. Viewed in
static terms, this process may appear circular. Viewed as an ev·olutionary process, it more nearly resembles a bit on a drill,
whose rotation permits it to penetrate solid wood.
Determining the content of the rights that define-justice does
not, however, exhaust the whole of moral inquiry. An analysis
that identifies the rights people have with a bounded jurisdiction to control physical resources does not stipulate how people should go about exercising their rights. For example,
should one be an egoist exercising one's rights solely to benefit
oneself, an altruist exercising one's rights solely to benefit
others, or somewhere in between?
Natural rights theorists sometimes distinguished between
perfect and imperfect rights and duties. Perfect rights referred
to those rights that created an enforceable duty in others. Imperfect rights created duties ·that did not justify the use of coer.cion.57 The natural rights analysis described above addresses
only the question of enforceability. The question of unenforceable moral duties must be addressed by the broader moral inquiry know as ethics. 58 Much needless controversy about moral
57. For a detailed treatment of the distinction drawn by classical natural rights theorists between enforceable and unenforceable duties in the context of the theories of
James Wilson, see Hills, The Reconciliation ofLaw and Liberty in james WILson, 12 HARv. J.L.
Be PuB. PoL'Y 891 (1989). He summarizes Wilson's version as follows:
[A] duty without a correlative right is an act that a pers.on ought to perform to
reach his natural end but that may not be extorted from him by force, because
no other person is impartial enough to be trusted with the power to enforce
the duty. Duties that do entail correlative rights result from those negative
rights of strict justice (do not kill, do not steal, etc.), which can be implemented by force because all humans possess the minimum degree of impartiality necessary to curb the excessive self-love of a murderer or thief.
Id. at 924.
58. Lon Fuller made a similar distinction between the morality of aspiration (what I
am calling the ethical or good) and the morality of duty (what I am calling the right or
just):
The morality of aspiration ..• is the morality of the Good Life, of excellence,
of the fullest realization of human powers .... Where the morality of aspiration starts at the top of human achievement, the morality of duty starts at the
bottom. It lays down the basic rules without which an ordered society is im-
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rights is generated by the idea that an adequate rights theory
must address not only the problem of unjust conduct thatjustifies legal enforcement, but also the problem of good or ethical
conduct that justifies nonviolent sanctions.
The general issue of good conduct far exceeds the domain of
natural rights, with one significant exception. Although a natural rights analysis does not specify any particular theory of the
good and seeks to permit the pursuit of differing conceptions
of the good life, it does prevent, at least indirectly, certain conceptions of the good from being achieved. A natural rights approach 'solves the problem of social order by placing certain
restrictions on the means one may use to pursue happiness.
Consequently and unavoidably, those who believe that their
pursuit of happiness requires them to use the very means that
are proscribed cannot be permitted to do so. For example,
those who find their gratification in having intercourse with
others against their will may not pursue this course of action,
because this pursuit runs afoul of the principles of justice that
make human life in society possible. Of course, such action is
not only unjust, it is also morally despicable. That an action is
morally despicable, however, is neither necessary nor sufficient
to justify its legal prohibition.
In sum, a liberal natural rights approach is neutral among
those alternative ways of pursuing happiness, of which there
are a great many, that are consistent with the basic requirements of social order. Because it prohibits conduct-whether
viewed as morally good or bad-that violates the precepts of
justice or right, it will unavoidably, but incidentally, prohibit
some action that is morally bad. Persons who wish to pursue
happiness by violating the rights of others may be condemned
for acting badly (that is, contrary to the good); they may be
forcibly coerced, however, only because they are acting unjustly (that is, contrary to the just or right).
That a natural rights approach restricts bad (as distinct from
unjust) conduct comes as no surprise. However, a natural
rights approach also restricts good conduct. Earlier I described
the legal enterprise-with its rivalrous components of the rule
possible, or without which an ordered society directed toward certain specific
goals must fail of its mark. ... It does not condemn men for failing to embrace
opponunities for the fullest realization of their powers. Instead, it condemns
them for failing to respect the basic requirements of social living.
L. FuLLER, supra note 2, at 5-6.
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oflaw and natural rights based on both a moral rights and consequentialist analysis-as. the means by which we solve the
problem of social order. 59 But social order is not the only problem facing persons living in society with others. What about the
provision of food, water, shelter, and other material, not to
mention spiritual, needs of life? Does not the legal enterprise
have an important role to play in the provision or at least the
distribution of all these goods as well?
A full answer to this question requires that one actually work
out the natural rights approach. I have begun this project elsewhere and have addressed this question there. 60 Still, some basic methodological observations can be made here. First, one
ought not use the mechanisms that enable social order to exist
to address other pressing problems if doing so seriously undermines the ability of these mechanisms to continue to address
the problem of social order. The attainment of social order is a
prerequisite to effectively addressing the other problems of social life. A society in complete or near chaos cannot address any
social problem effectively, however serious it may be. Elsewhere I have analogized this point to stealing from a building's
foundation to add more floors to the top. 61 A very welldesigned building can tolerate a bit of this type of activity without collapsing, but a policy of taking from the foundation to
build a higher building increases the risk of collapse from the
very first taking and ensures that a catastrophe will occur at
some point if it is continued.
Second, if establishing and preserving social order actually
prevented the effective pursuit of these other vital goals, we
would seriously question the priority we place on social order.
To the contrary, however, the achievement of social order
based on the precepts of justice and the rule of .law makes it
possible for other institutions to pursue other goals without violating the constraints imposed by these precepts ofjustice. Indeed, a consequentialist analysis would reveal such institutions
to be far more capable of addressing these problems than any
known alternative.
Finally, the natural rights method I have described with its
59. See supra notes !18-56 and accompanying text.
60. See Barnett, supra note 47, at 60-6!1. I am ~ently in the process of developing
this approach in the context of an extensive explanation of the liberal conceptions of
justice and the rule of law.
61. Stt id. at 62.
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consequentialist component allows the theoretical possibility
that, in extreme and abnormal instances, exceptions can be
made. I am skeptical that any exception to the regime ofjustice
and the rule oflaw is necessary or prudent, but about this question reasonable people in the liberal tradition have and will
continue to differ. In my view this disagreement at the margin
does not undermine the basic approach to rights and consequences that I have sketched here.
CONCLUSION: WHY COMPETING MODES OF ANALYSIS?

The approach I have sketched here is multifaceted. It consists of a process of dispute resolution that is governed by principles of the rule of law. The particular outcomes of this
evolving legal process are then subjected to rational scrutiny
provided by a natural rights analysis that has both a moral
rights and a consequentialist component. The results of this
process of critical reason are then folded back into practice to
see how they far~. Why is a multifaceted approach necessary? If
the rule of law is sound, why do we not just accept the results it
recommends? If a moral rights analysis is sound, why do we not
just accept the results it recommends? If a consequentialist
analysis is sound, why do we not just accept the results it
recommends?
Part of the answer has already been provided. The processes
governed by the rule oflaw are needed to settle disputes before
the results of an intellectual inquiry are in. This process generates a set of practices sophisticated enough to be subjected to
rational scrutiny. Moral rights analysis permits us to discern,
however abstra_ctly, the conditions that are needed for individuals and groups to pursue happiness in society with each other
without wasteful and tragic experimentation. Consequentialist
analysis is needed to test and refine the conclusions recommended by a moral rights analysis.
Another part of the answer concerns the twin problems of
human error and deception that I referred to elsewhere as the
problems of·knowledge and interest. 62 Because we know that
the results of any mode of analysis can be mistaken, the more
different modes of analysis that point in the same direction the
62. See Barnett, supra note 38 (discussing the role that liberal conceptions ofjustice
and the rule of law play in solving the social problems of knowledge, interest, and
power).
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more certain we can be that the results of our analysis are correct. Because we know that some people are willing to lie both
to others and to themselves to aggrandize their interests at the
expense of others, we need ways to discern deception when it
occurs-particularly when argument~ are couched in familiar
terms. Evil, as well as order, can be advocated on the grounds
of tradition, morality, or expediency. It often takes a multifaceted analysis to show why such arguments are false, and, as
we know, even a multifaceted analysis may not be enough.
Finally, social order requires the use of force in defense of
the moral rights embodied in law against those who would violate these rights to serve their own interest. But permitting
force to be used to address the problem of interest creates the
problem of power. The problem of power is·a special instance
of the problems ofknowledge and interest. For, once the use of
power is permitted at all, we need to know when it is proper to
use it. Using power raises the cost of erroneous judgment by
imposing greater burdens on those who are mistakenly victimized. And the instruments of power are powerful means to enhance the interests of those who wield it. For both these
reasons we must place limits or constraints on the exercise of
power--constraints that are, in part, provided by the multiple
criteria ofjustice, with its components of moral rights and consequences, and the rule of law. The other important constraint
is the maintenance of competing institutions capable in extremes of using force against offending persons and
institutions. 65
In sum, the checks and balances approach to both concepts
and institutions is the best way we know of to achieve and maintain social order in the face of the serious problems of knowledge, interest, and power. An approach that purports to solve
other pressing problems while ignoring these wiil be unsuccessful in both theory and practice.
THE IHS LAw AND

PHILOSOPHY

IssuE

This is the fifth year that the Institute for Humane Studies at
George Mason University and the Harvard journal of Law and
Public Policy have collaborated on an issue devoted to law and
-63. See Barnett, Pursuing]u.stice in a Free Society: Part Two-Crime Prevention and the Legal
Order, CRtM.jUST. Ennes, Winter-Spring 1985, at 37-47 (discussing the need for and
operation of a nonmonopolistic legal order).
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philosophy. Volume Twelve marks a substantial change in our
format. This issue commences with the article that received the
1988 IHS Lon L. Fuller Prize in Jurisprudence: Jules L. Coleman, Douglas D. Heckathorn, and Stephen M. Maser's A Bargaining Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in
Contract Law. This is followed by a "Symposium on the Compatibility of Rights and Consequential Analysis." The contributors are Larry Alexander, Richard A. Epstein, Loren E.
Lomasky, Eric Mack, Jeremy Waldron (last year's Fuller Prize
recipient), and Christopher Wonnell. This marks the first time
that an IHS Law and Philosophy Issue includes a symposium
devoted to a particular topic. Appearing after the symposium
are two excellent papers by recipients of IHS Leonard P. Cassidy Summer Research Fellowships in Law and Philosophy:
Roderick M. Hill's The Reconciliation of Law and Liberty in James
Wilson, and Catherine Valcke's Locke on Property: A Philosophical
Interpretation.
Thanks are, of course, due to the authors who produced such
excellent papers. Thanks are also due to Jackson R. Sharman
III, the Editor-in-Chief of the Journal, and his editorial staff.
They have been a joy to work with. I also wish to express my
appreciation to Walter Grinder of the Institute for all his assistance in planning this issue. Finally, I extend my deepest gratitude to the board of directors of the Verit~s Fund, Inc. for
providing the funding for this annual IHS Law and Philosophy
Issue, the IHS Lon L. Fuller Prize in Jurisprudence, and the
IHS Leonard P. Cassidy Summer Research Fellowships in Law
and Philosophy.
Perhaps the collaboration between the several independent
institutions that made this issue possible and the multifaceted
creative processes that makes social order possible are analogous. Without the very different contributions of these distinct
but equal partners it is unlikely that we would be able to
achieve our common end.

